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Investment banks …nd it pro…table to invest in the development of innovative
derivative securities even without being able to preclude early competition
from other investment banks using patents. To explain this, we assume that
thedeveloper canlearnfromthe…rst issues oftheinnovative …nancial product
and is able to become the expert issuer by the time imitation enters the
market. We show how this becomes an informational …rst-mover advantage
that turns innovators into the market leader. It is this advantage, and not
the typical temporary monopoly position awarded to a patent holder, that
provides the incentive to pay the development costs. In the aftermath, the
innovator ends up with the largest share of the underwriting market and
makes positive pro…ts. Our model’s predictions are consistent with many
stylized facts of …nancial innovations by investment banks.
JEL Classi…cation: G24, L12, L89.
Keywords: Financial innovation, …rst-mover advantages,
asymmetric information, learning-by-doing.1 Introduction
1.1 The Motivation
Unlike many innovative products, innovations in …nancial products remain
largely unpatentable.1 Some developments in Industrial OrganizationTheory
show that, for some industries, patents are the only mechanism that can
make it optimal for …rms to pay the research and development costs (R&D
henceforth) if their invented product would otherwise be reverse-engineered,
produced and marketed by competitors that free-ride R&D. In such type of
models, the free entry eliminates pro…ts and potential innovators will choose
not to invest in R&D without legal protection against imitation.2
Nevertheless, some models of product innovation can generate equilibria
with positive innovator pro…ts even when they cannot patent their discover-
ies.3 One possibility is to assume that the developer has a lead-time over his
1Only recently, in January of 1999, a patent for a “…nancial method or formula” was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court. The State Street Bank of Boston sued
to invalidate a patent for a valuation algorithm by the Signature Financial Group of
Massachussetts, arguing that it violated the business method exemption in patent laws.
The Supreme Court upheld the patent, setting an important precedent that may make
most innovations in …nance patentable. As Lerner [11] argues, the number of patent …llings
and awards may sharply increase now that the State Street Case has been settled.
2See Tirole [24, Ch. 10] for a description of the reasons why imitation of discoveries
produces incentives for maintaining low levels of R&D.
3Benoît [3] and Reinganum [19] provide some notable examples.
1imitators. If this lead-time is long enough or, if R&D costs are small enough,
innovators canearn su¢ciently large monopolist rents prior to imitation so as
to justify the initial R&D expenditures. In essence, this e¤ect is qualitatively
no di¤erent than the e¤ect of a patent. Another possibility is to assume that
clients have costs of switching from the …rst provider of the new service (the
innovator) to the late comers (the imitators). In this case the pioneer can
e¤ectively build large market shares and earn rents.
The delayed imitation hypothesis cannot be reconciled with the most im-
portant piecesof evidenceof product innovation in…nance. Tufano[26] found
that periods of “monopolistic” issuing of new …nancial services are relatively
short.4 This makes a strong case against the argument that only su¢ciently
long periods of temporary monopoly make innovations worthwhile. In the
same study, Tufano [26] also found that, for the 58 innovations he studied
between 1974 and 1986, the investment banks that created them could not
charge monopolistic underwriting fees before imitation occurred. Further, al-
though data on innovation costs is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests
4For all the 58 innovations he studied, the median number of underwriting deals com-
pleted by the innovating bank prior to entry by rival banks was of only one.
2that these are not negligible.5,6
As Bhattacharyya and Nanda [4] point out, banks and clients may de-
velop valuable relationships, making it costly for a …rm to switch bankers.
Thus, switching costs can explain why early imitation may not erode an in-
novator’s pro…ts and therefore its incentives to innovate. Evidence gathered
in interviews to bankers by Naslund [15] suggests that switching costs might
not be signi…cant, “the banks mentioned that if one came up with an idea
the innovator became known as the expert and customers would turn to it
even if they used another bank for other services”.7
The clue to what are the advantages to inovators in …nance, despite all
the disadvantages mentioned above, seems to be the fact that investment
banks are able to capture the largest share of underwriting deals using the
product they created. This is found in Tufano’s sample of 58 securities,
where despite being imitated early, the innovators preserve the leadership
5The relevant innovation cost is not only R&D, but all the sunk payments required
to discover and introduce an innovation. Mans…eld [13] disaggregates them in R&D, the
building of production facilities, and marketing. In the IO literature, these costs are
usually referred to as R&D. In this paper we follow the IO convention and use the term
R&D to refer to total innovation costs.
6Investment bankers interviewed by Tufano [26] reportedly spent between $50,000 and
$5 million to develop each new security. In a study by Naslund[15], marketing costs for
innovations by 20 …nancial institutions range between $1 million and $3 million.
7Krigman, Shaw and Womack [10] mention other reasons why …rms switch underwrit-
ers, the most important being the tendency to gradually select more reputed bankers to
bene…t from the higher quality of their research analysts.
3in the long run. Other evidence of innovators becoming market leaders is
found in Reilly [18]: Drexel Burnham Lambert, the pioneer in underwriting
junk bonds had at least a 40% of the market between 1985 and 1988. Also,
according to Mason et. al. [12] First Boston, the innovator of asset-backed
securities, underwrote a share that almost doubled that of the second largest
underwriter in this market between 1985 and 1991. More recently, Schroth
[22] found that for most of the innovative equity-linked securities between
1985 and 2001 the innovators also had the lead in the corporate underwriting
market. For other classes of derivatives the evidence is scarce. In fact, as
Gastineau and Margolis [9] argue, some derivatives markets are not easy to
de…ne and market shares di¢cult to compute or disaggregate. Nevertheless,
they argue that market makers are likely to have the largest market shares,
as observed in the underwriting markets for the securities already mentioned.
Thus, it seems innovation in securities di¤ers qualitatively from other
kinds of product innovation. Most of the research in …nancial innovation has
examined extensively case studies and asked why there was a demand for
some new securities at the time they were introduced.8 In other words, the
8Miller [14], for example, argues that what spurred the latest innovation “wave” were
loopholes in tax codes that provided incentives to design securities that circumvented
regulation. Finnerty [8] describes di¤erent ways in which new securities add value and
relates them to corporate …nancial innovations since the 70s. A broader survey of the
4focus has been, basically, on explaining what made each particular innova-
tion attractive to investors. Not much research, though, has addressed the
question of why an unpatentable innovation is worth its R&D expenditure
if imitation is early and seemingly costless.9 The question we try to answer
here is why do investment banks …nd it privately pro…table to be developers
of marketable …nancial instruments.
1.2 The Agenda
The large variety of innovations observed in …nance induces us to pursue a
theory of innovation speci…c to some kind of …nancial products. Our model
will focus on privately negotiated …nancial contracts that are designed to
transfer the credit exposure of an underlying asset between two parties. As
we will argue later, this type of contracts include several types of private
deals made between competitive investment banks and the holders of claims
to some asset with random payo¤s. These holders may want to issue a new
history …nancial innovation can be found in Tufano [27].
9In a general setting, Boldrin and Levine [6] show how the natural monopoly position
of the innovator as a provider of the original prototype can make the innovative process
worthwhile despite imitation. In the case of …nancial innovation, Black and Silber [5]
present a model in which the innovator is a futures exchange that develops and advantage
for creating a new contract by providing liquidity for investors earlier than the competing
exchanges in order to attract future trades.
5security whose payo¤ is backed by the cash‡ow of the underlying asset or
may just wan to swap away part of the risky component of the cash‡ow. A
particular characteristic of the market where these deals are made is that the
transactions made, for example, a credit swap or the purchase of a portfolio
of credit card collectibles, are not observable for free. Con…dentiality agree-
ments in these markets are e¤ective mechanisms that allow the banker (e.g.,
an innovator of a derivative) to conceal crucial information from potential
competitors.
It is clear from our motivation that the innovator must have an advan-
tage over its imitators. Since for …nancial innovations the lead-time is on
average short and the development cost is substantial, the innovator must
make supra-normal pro…ts during the imitation stage. After revising some
case studies in innovation in credit derivatives or asset securitization we can
identify a common feature: bankers choose not to disclose the history of deals
they have made but rather disclose only the aggregate dollar amount of the
transactions made in a given period. Presumably, the knowledge of the his-
tory of their deals made is valuable and they are keen not to make it public.
Therefore, the model we present here explains why the innovator extracts
private information from early deals and uses it to compete with its imita-
6tors once they enter the market. As William Toy, Managing Director at CDC
Capital Inc. puts it, “There is at least a perception that the …rst mover is
more familiar with the product he issues than the imitator”.[25]
In the model, the advantage enjoyed by the …rst-mover will be based on
an information asymmetry: innovators will have had one previous period
of deal making and will acquire …ner information on the distribution of cash
‡ows held by di¤erent types of clients. Whenimitators enter the market, this
endogenously generated information advantage will make them the “expert”
banker. The expert banker will be able to o¤er better deals to institutions
than the competition and realize a positive pro…t. In short, this paper is a
particular application of Bayesian learning to corporate …nance: investment
banks learn about the uncertainty in the market of corporate underwriting
from past deals, and they are di¤erentiated by the time at which they start
the learning process. Thus, moving …rst puts them ahead in the learning
curve.
In another testimony by a practitioner, we can …nd additional evidence
that bankers learn from the deals made in the early issues of a new …nancial
product: “Financial Innovations such as Credit Derivatives, are not like pro-
ducing a new car, where you just sell it once manufactured. In every deal
7the Innovation changes: it is perfected to better suited the client’s needs. By
the …fth or sixth deal you are able to sell a much better product,” (Tom No-
bile, Managing Director, Bank of NY).[16] To this date, we know of very few
applications of Bayesian learning in corporate …nance (perhaps most notable
being that one of Diamond [7]). We believe that this paper shows that mod-
eling the dynamics of learning is promising to understand better the nature
and the facts of product innovation in …nance more generally.
In the next section we describe brie‡y some case studies in innovation of
…nancial products with the objective of illustrating better the type of asym-
metry that our model exhibits. Then, we continue by modeling the pro…t
maximizing behavior of investment banks that either create a new …nancial
product or imitate it and their counterparts in the deal. We characterize a
generic contract that can resemble a part of a credit derivative transaction
(e.g. a credit risk swap) or the securitizationof anasset (e.g., a mortgage or a
loan) and specify the pro…ts that accrue to each ofthe parties in the contract.
The third section presents the general set-up in which innovators develop an
information advantage over imitators by moving …rst in the earliest stage of
the game. The learning process is formalized in the general case and then
a simple case is used to solve for the equilibrium in the subsequent section.
8There we show how it is optimal for an investment bank to innovate in the
…rst stage when it chooses between developing and marketing an innovation
or not. The …nal section summarizes our results.
2 Some Cases of Product Innovation in Fi-
nance
In this paper we argue that the innovator of a …nancial product derives the
advantage that ultimately makes it pro…table to move …rst rather than free-
ride from the fact that he positions ahead of his competitors in a learning
curve. Below we discuss some well document cases in the literature in which
we can see that the innovators had private information about their prod-
ucts and were keen not to disclose more information than they were legally
required. This will …x our ideas for the theory presented afterwards.
2.1 The Securitization of Charge-Card Receivables
ThesecuritizationoftheAmericanExpress charge-cardreceivables by Lehman
Brothers in 1992 is a case that matches very well the model of innovation
we suggest. By February 1992, the portfolio of outstanding charge-card col-
9lectibles was not was not traded as a security. Mason et. al. [12] suggest
that “... Lehman sawtheAmerican Express charge-carddeal as animportant
demonstrationofitsstructuringabilities and as ameansbywhichitcouldfur-
ther establish itself as an innovative and leading underwriter of asset-backed
securities”.10 Thus, the possibility of underwriting a large share of charge-
card receivables motivated Lehman Brothers to come up with a new security,
di¤erent to the existing credit-card-backed or …xed-asset-backed securities.
It consistedon issuing debt collateralized by a portfolio of charge-cardreceiv-
ables. Interest payments to the holders of the security were …nanced by an
additional discount on the purchase of the receivables, which was declared as
the yield and used to provide a liquidity cushion against the risk of default.
Note that asset-backed securities traded before the charge-card-backed prod-
ucts used …nancing charges to pay interest, but charge-cards do not collect
…nance charges.
In the …rst deal, 6’995,152 accounts were selected at random from Amer-
ican Express’s portfolio and bundled in a master trust. These accounts
amounted to $2.4 billion, while the total value of outstanding charge card
receivables was $6.9 billion. Later, the underwriter and the issuer had the
10By that time, a large share of Credit-Card receivables had already been securitized by
Citibank and First Boston and where publicly traded.
10faculty to add or remove accounts from the trust. As documented by Ma-
son et. al. [12], the securitization process allowed them to isolate accounts
and have information on the trust performance on a monthly basis. For the
sale prospectus though, it was not required to disclose individual account
information, just aggregate statistics.
2.2 Nikkei 225 Put Warrants
The Nikkei 225 Put Warrant was a complicated transaction by which invest-
ment banks underwrote the issue of a put option on the performance of the
Nikkei 225 index. Issuers were generally sovereign …rms and the security was
traded in the United States (American Stock Exchange). Goldman, Sachs,
Inc. was the …rst investment banker to underwrite such issues. The …rst deal
was completed in January of 1990.
This innovation was attractive to American investors because they were
able to hold a security that would allow them to bet against the Nikkei 225
Index by buying the put option (expectations then were that the Nikkei 225
would soon revert its upward trend, and it did). Sovereign issuers could use
this security as a cheaper source of …nance, given the expectations in the US
market about the Nikkei 225. Since the probability that the holders would
11exercise their option was high, Goldman, Sachs swapped with the issuers the
risk of conversion and hedged this risk itself in its investment portfolio.
Since then, Goldman pioneered this type of deal in the 1990s and was, for
a decade, the only investment bank to underwrite such a deal for issuers that
were not the bank itself (the investment banking departments of Salomon
Inc., Bankers Trust and Paine Webber underwrote these products but their
own investment divisions were the issuers). In fact, Goldman started engi-
neering put warrants type of deals but using di¤erent indexes, like France’s
CAC-40.
It is also worth noting that Goldman’s hedging positions for each one of
these deals were not disclosed (see Ryan and Granovsky [21])
2.3 Other Cases
Some anecdotal evidence also exhibits similar factures as the ones described
in the cases above. Thackray [23], for example, documents how Drexel,
Brunham, Lambert did not disclose its “junk-bond” prospectuses to Wall
Street insiders because of fears that competitor’s imitations may challenge
their lead in the market for underwriting high-yield debt. J.P. Morgan’s lead
in underwriting asset-backed securities using its so called BISTRO variety
12of a collateralized loan obligation arguably hinges on the discretion with
which it manages the pool of assets used as collateral (Roper [20]). Salomon
dominated the market of ELKS (equity-linked securities), its own creation,
and also managed the pool of backing assets at its discretion.
3 The Structure of the Model
In the subsections that followwe introduce theinformation structure whichis
general to the class of …nancial innovations discussed throughout the paper.
3.1 Asset Holders and their Types
We de…ne a set of relevant states of the world Z =f1;2;:::;Zg; which repre-
sents the set of all possible contingencies of the cash ‡ows of the assets that
di¤erent …rms or institutional investors have full claim to. Henceforth, we
shall refer to these agents as issuers. Essentially, as we shall see this cash‡ow
is used to back the issue of a new security, hence the use of that notation.
The true state, Z; will be a random draw from of a prior distribution G(Z)
over the set Z. The knowledge of this distribution is common to all invest-
ment banks. The actual realization of Z is unknown andwill not be observed
13ex-post either.
There is a …nite set of types of issuers, i.e., potential clients of the banks,
F =f1;2;:::;Fg: For each type there are many identical issuers and the cash
‡ow of any one of type f is itself a random variable whose distribution is
conditional on the state of the world. Let each unit of this cash ‡ow be
denoted by Xf; and let Hf(xjZ) be its distribution conditional on the state
of the world that is realized. As we will see below, from the knowledge of
this distribution and the observations of X something can be learned about
the true realization of Z.
The notion of a type in this context, can be understood more intuitively
by relating it to the examples mentioned above. When Lehman Brothers up-
dated the selection of accounts in the pool of American Express charge-card
collectibles they used information of the credit pro…les of the holders. Simi-
larly, Salomon Brothers had to form a pool of stocks to back the repayment
of the issue of equity-linked securities dubbed ELKS. The types of stocks
selected would be the types we refer to here, and would be those that are
particularly related to the dividend stream stipulated by the security issued.
In the case of mortgage-backed securities, the types can correspond also to
the risk pro…les of the borrowers, which is e¤ectively approximated by the
14geographical distribution of the loans.11
3.2 The Contract
Herewe model a private contractbetweena potential issuer withclaims to Xf
and a banker. In this contract the issuer agrees to sell the payment stream it
owns to the investment bank in exchange for another cash ‡ow with di¤erent
characteristics. Ingeneral, these two cash‡ows mayhave di¤erent credit risk,
di¤erent types of indexation (currencies, commodity prices, interest rates),
and di¤erent degrees of association with other random variables.
Formally, the type f will sell ®f units of its payment stream, which has a
certain dependence on the realization of the unknown state of the world. In
exchange for each unit Xf; shegets oneunit of the payo¤ stream Y; whichhas
a di¤erent dependence on z:12 For each unit exchanged, the banker charges
a transaction fee, s:13
11Coincidentally, Fannie Mae, the largest issuer of mortage-backed securities and col-
lateralized mortgage obligations started reporting publicly the disaggregation of the pool
of securiticized mortgages in its 2001 Information Statement. The …rst mortgage-backed
securities were introduced in the early 1980s.
12In general, Y can be made contingent on many observable random variables. Credit
derivatives will often provide insurance to …nancial institutions by swaping their uncertain
cash ‡ow for one which is tied to amore popular and less volatile index, e.g., tied to LIBOR.
Y can also be a payment in cash if the banker is just buying outstanding loans to pool
them.
13This fee would be equivalente to the unit underwriting spread.
15It is important to stress the fact that the market for these private con-
tracts di¤ersfrom agenericproductmarket inwhichthere aremany potential
buyers of a product and where every seller cannot monitor each transaction
made by their competitors. The market for private …nancial contracts de-
scribed here is a market where the bank’s counterparts (the issuers) are
institutional investors or big corporations, so each transaction can be moni-
tored. In e¤ect, however, many details of such contracts are generally kept
private for some time, and the very fact that they can be monitored makes
it easier to detect any infringement of the con…dentiality agreements on the
part of the clients. Thus, the adverse e¤ect on the reputation of the clients
constitutes a strong incentive to honor the agreement.
3.3 The Innovation
Investment banks pool di¤erent types of payment streams and form a port-
folio which is suited to the objectives of the bank. For example, the pool
may be used as collateral for the newly issued security (which is sold to out-
side investors), or it may be used to hedge the current positions that the
bank itself has. In the case of mortgage-banked securities, the pool of out-
standing mortgages was used to back the payment of interest of the di¤erent
16tranches of securities issued. In the case of the Nikkei 225 Put Warrants,
the bankers insured the issuer of the put on the Nikkei index by swapping
away from them the risk of investors exercising the put option and hedg-
ing the risk themselves in their own investment portfolio. A wide array of
credit derivatives also falls in this category. Some examples are Interest Rate
Swaps, Collateralized Debt Obligations, and other highly structured debt in-
struments in which investment banks swap with the issuers the default risk
of a pool of assets.
The innovation here is essentially the development of the payment func-
tion Y that issuers would trade for their own income stream. However, an
important part of doing deals using this new contract is making them with
the right types of issuers, i.e., getting right the types of cash ‡ows more suit-
able for the pool. More speci…cally, the innovation will be fully determined
by Y and the tuple ® 2 <F of the proportions of each type of investment
cash ‡ows that form the bundle. We will call this vector ® the bundle spec-
i…cation. In other words, the innovation consists of a new way to swap the
cash ‡ow of issuers, and a clever way of bundling them together.
We take as given the fact that the deal is attractive to the issuer because
the new income stream Y is more convenient than their current stream Xf :
17it may have a lower credit risk or be negatively correlated with some other
income streams they have.
We will assume thatinevery deal, thecomponentY is thesame regardless
ofthe issuer’s type that the investment bank deals with. Given this, a generic
contract with a type f institution can be fully characterized by the two
variables (®f;s): ®f denotes the amount of cash ‡ow owned by institution f
that will be swapped for an equivalent amount of Y and s denotes the per
unit fee charged by the investment bank for this transaction.
We assume that every banker has a bound on the number of units of cash
‡ows it can swap. Without loss of generality we can normalize this upper
bound to one and have:




that is, ® belongs to the unit simplex in F:
183.4 Pro…ts from the Deal
In general, if a banker purchases an amount ®fXf from a type f issuer; it
will give in exchange ®fY . In addition, it will charge a fee ®fs: The revenue
for a type f issuer, net of the underwriting fee would be:
®f(Y ¡ s): (2)
On the other hand, the revenue of the investment bank for that one deal
would be:
®f(Xf +s):




(®fXf + ®fs ¡ ®fY ) = '(z) + s¡ Y; (3)




®fXf(z) 8z 2 Z:
193.5 Description of the Game
We model …nancial innovation as a three stage game of a …nite number of
investment bankers, indexed by i = 1;2;:::;I:
Each stage is a time period t = 0;1 and 2:
At t = 0 one of the banker decides whether or not to invest in the in-
novation, paying an R&D cost C to develop a new type of private
…nancial contract (e.g., a credit derivative or an asset-backed security).
The probability that this innovation is successful, i.e., that it will at-
tract institutions and induce them to sign deals with the banker will be
µ 2 (0;1). Twobankers developingthe sameinstrument simultaneously
is a zero probability event.
At t = 1 only the banker that paid C moves. We call this investment bank
the innovator. It will sign underwriting contracts with a set of issuers.
At t = 2 the designofthe new…nancial product is revealedto theinvestment
banks that did not innovate (the imitators). They can implement this
new design without paying C and be certain that it was a success.
The business of this innovative deal making becomes competitive: all
investment banks now engagein Bertrand Competitioninunderwriting
20Innovator: Choose a, s Observe signal Choose a, s
Yes
Imitators: No move Observe Y Choose a, s
No Game Over
Innovator: Pay C?
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Figure 1: An illustration of the timing of the game. There are three periods,
and only the banker that pays the R&D cost in period 0 moves in period 1.
In period 2, the innovator and its imitators compete for market share. The
innovator has had one previous period of making deals, that allowed him to
extract a private signal.
fees.
See Figure 1 for an illustration of the timing described above.
3.6 Interpretation of the Game
At the start, an investment bank has to decide whether to develop or not a
…nancial product. This product has a development cost C; and it is designed
to attract issuers that hold claims to certain types of random cash ‡ows.
Once developed, the innovator makes the …rst underwriting deals, being the
only underwriter of the issues using such a contract. Immediately after the
…rst contracts are signed, some information about them always …lters out
21to other investment banks that become able to imitate the product.14 The
market for this type of underwriting becomes competitive then. By the time
imitation comes in, though, the innovator has already concluded some deals
and has been able to gain some expertise. This will allow him to perfect the
deal and, in particular, to improve the underlying money making scheme.
This idea is summarized by the following testimony: “In Credit Derivatives,
imitators can fully understand our new product but they don’t know how to
make money with it,” (Andrei Paracivescu, Credit Derivatives Trader, J.P.
Morgan.)[17]
The result of learning-by-doing is an information advantage of the devel-
oper over the imitators. In our framework, the innovator will have learned to
matchmore appropriately the di¤erent typesofinstitutions’ payment streams
creating abetter portfolio of deals, i.e., enhancing his money-making scheme.
Since the innovator’s benchmark contract or terms-sheet is revealed (in this
model what is revealed is Y; or what to swap X for), the imitators can make
their own deals, o¤ering the same contract but they will not have the same
skill and expertise as innovators in creating the portfolio of deals. Again, as
14Although these kinds of privatecontracts are strictly con…dential, information is leaked
in various ways: the client may go to other investment banks to seek a better fee, or people
that develop these products may be hired away to competing banks.
22a Wall Street practitioner puts it, “everybody can see the laid-out contract
but what Iam careful not to disclose are the positions in my book. With this
information you could track down the logic and see where I make money,”
(Andrei Paracivescu, Credit Derivatives Trader, J.P. Morgan.)[17]
4 The Innovator’s Learning Process
In this section we explain the mechanism through which this learning-by-
doing occurs, and illustrate what is the private signal that allows the innova-
tor to have asymmetric information which is advantageous over its imitators.
4.1 The General Set-up
To …x ideas, let F = Z so that there are as many types of issuers as states
of the world. Issuers of any type can have either a high cash ‡ow, H; or a
low one, L: “Good” states for di¤erent types will be those states where the
probability of having a high cash ‡owis greater than having a lowone; “bad”
states will be those in which the latter is not true. To simplify, we assume
that for each type there is only one good state. Further, we will assume that
this state is only good for that type of …rm. Without loss of generality, let
23the good state for any arbitrary type f 2 F be such that z = f. Thus, we
can summarize Hf(xjz) by:
Pr(Xf = Hjz = f) = 1¡ "; (4)
Pr(Xf = Hjz 6= f) = °;8f 2 F;z 2 Z;
where " and ° are small enough (all we need is for them to be smaller than
1
2). Figure 2 illustrates these conditional distributions, for the case of Type
1 issuers.
Consider the case of an investment bank that has no information about
thetrue state of the world. The bank knows the prior probability distribution
G(Z) overthe statesthat, to keepthings simple, we assume tobe theuniform.
An innovator gets a signal in the …rst stage. This signal, e x; gives him a more
accurate knowledge of the realized state of the world. It is an F-dimensional
vector of the cash ‡ows of each institution from each type realized in the …rst
stage, formally, e x 2 fH;LgF: Conditional onthis signal, andthe distributions
given by (4), the innovator updates his prior beliefs on the actual realization
of the state of the world. Notice that the signal can be mapped in two

















Figure 2: Conditional probability distribution function of the cash ‡ow that
an issuer of Type 1 has claims to. z is the underlying random variable that
introduces uncertainty in the cash ‡ow, and there are Z possible states of
nature, one being the “good state” for each type. Note that H > L:
25“high types”) and the other containing those that did not (the “low types”).
4.2 Bayesian Updating
For a uniform prior we have that 8z;Pr(Z = z) =
1
Z: The generic signal will
be a sequence of H and L. Now, we can de…ne the sets
H = ff 2 FjXf = Hg and L = ff 2 FjXf = Lg;
and let #(H) = h and #(L) = l, so that h+ l = Z:
Then for any state j 2 H , the posterior probability that this was the
realized state would be given by:

































> 1 for " and ° small enough: For states k 2 L,


























Z +h[¸ ¡ 1]
:
Then, for most signals, i.e., for h = 1;2;:::;Z¡1; there will be updating, i.e.:
Pr(z = jje x) >
1
Z
> Pr(z = kje x):
Notice that the di¤erence between the probabilities above is ¸¡1
Z+h[¸¡1]; which
is decreasing in the observed number h of high types. Intuitively, the set of
states of the world is partitioned in one with those more likely states and
another with the less likely. The smaller h; the smaller the set of more likely
states and the larger its complement. Thus, each state within the smaller set
has more probability of being the realized one.
Note that the signals (H;H;:::;H) and (L;L;:::;L) don’t allow any up-
dating of the prior distribution G(Z): The probability that the innovator
gets a signal which allows updating, and in consequence, the probability of
27having superior information for the next issues of the new instrument is:
» = 1 ¡ (1¡ ")°
Z¡1¡ "(1¡ °)
Z¡1: (5)
4.3 Portfolio Choice for Innovators at t = 2
In this model investment banks choose a contract (®;s) to maximize the net
revenues given by (3) and taking as given the maximizing behavior of the
issuers that they deal with. Since the fee s does not a¤ect the value of the
bankers portfolio, '(z); we can break down the optimization problem in two
parts. First, banks solve the following problem:
choose ® = (®1;®2;:::;®F) to maximize E['(z)] (P1)
subject to ® 2 ¢
F;
and Var['(z)] · V:
Investment banks are maximizing the expected value of their portfolio
subject totheconstraint that they cannot a¤ord alimited volatility ofreturns
in their portfolio.15 We assume that V is small enough so that the constraint
15This volatitlity restrictions are common practice in portfolio management. Besides,
this constraint also allows to solve the indeterminacy on the weights ® of all the H types
28is binding. This will imply that the problem has an interior solution: ®¤ 2
(0;1)F: Moreover,
Lemma 1 The Lagrangian for (P1), ¤; is symmetric with respect all ®f such
that f 2 H and all ®g such that g 2 L:
¤(:::;®i;:::;®j;:::) = ¤(:::;®j;:::;®i;:::) 8i;j 2 H;
¤(:::;®g;:::;®h;:::) = ¤(:::;®g;:::;®h;:::) 8g;h 2 L:
Proof. See appendix.
This will imply that the solution arising from the …rst-order condition is
also symmetric:
®i = ®H 8i 2 H, (6)
®i = ®
L 8i 2 L.
With updated beliefs on the states of the world, an informed banker will
nowform bundles that put more weight on the hightypes. That is, ®H > ®L:
and all the L types. Alternatively, a problem in which bankers have mean-variance utility
would produce the same result.
294.4 Portfolio Choice of Uninformed Bankers
Imitators, or innovators at t = 1; know only a prior distribution of the true
state of theworld. Thatis, they have not had thechance toobservethe signal
e x and update their beliefs. Given this information, and given the symmetry
of (P1), an uninformed banker can only form bundles with all the types of
…rms weighted symmetrically. That is, ®f =
1
F 8f:
The con…dentiality agreements guarantee that imitating banks are pre-
vented from gathering crucial information, such as the bundle speci…cation,
from the innovator’s clients. In reality, it is observed that bankers make
sure that their bundle speci…cation is not disclosed early enough. For ex-
ample, in the American Express Charge-Card securitization case, only the
aggregate value of the accounts pooled was publicly reported, andnot the ac-
tive management of the portfolio. Similarly, as we mentioned before, Drexel,
Brunham, Lambert were careful to keep private the order-‡ow of their “junk-
bond” deals. In more recent cases, it has been well documented that due to
discretionary management of thepools backing collateralized loanobligations
it is impossible to observe the positions and to be rated by Standard & Poor
(See Roper [20]).
Perhaps this fact is best summarized by a recent statement in the Recom-
30mendations for Disclosure of Trading and Derivatives Activities of Banks and
Securities Firms, by the Basle Committee onBanking Supervision, onFebru-
ary 1999: “institutions shoulddisclose information producedby theirinternal
risk measurement and management systems on their risk exposures and their
actual performance in managing these exposures. Linking public disclosure
to internal risk management processes helps ensure that disclosure keeps pace
with innovations in risk measurement and management techniques.”[2].
4.5 A Simple Case of Learning: Two types, Two states
The discussion above argues that …rst-movers are able to assign higher prob-
ability of occurrence to those states that are good for the institutions that
had high cash ‡ows at the …rst stage of the game (and lower probability to
the other states). Next, we develop the model for a simpler case where …rms
can be of one of two types only.
In the …rst stage, the …rst-mover develops the bundle with equal weights
for each type, i.e., ®1 = ®2 = 1
2: Imitators in the second stage have the same




Signals are drawn out of the set f(H;H);(H;L);(L;H);(L;L)g condi-
31tional on the realized state of the world. Notice that, in this symmetric
case, the signals (H;H);(L;L) do not allow any updating. From (5), this
probability equals " +° ¡ 2"°:
If the …rst mover observes any of the two signals that allowhim to update
his prior beliefs G(Z) then he will form a bundle in the second stage with
larger weight on high types. Let this weight be ®H. Then, it is clear that
®H > 1
2 > ®L = 1¡ ®H:
An event in this world is characterized by the triple (Z;X1;X2): Four of
the eight possible events involve non-informative signals and in two of them
the realized state is not the most likely one, given the signal. In the latter
cases, the future cash ‡ows of the …rm with more weight in the bundle would
be low with a large probability.
Based on this information structure we compute the expected payo¤s of
imitators’ and innovators’ portfolios using the Lemma below.
Lemma 2 In the case where Innovators can update their beliefs on the re-




H (1¡ °)(1¡ ")
(1¡ °)(1 ¡ ") +°"
+®
L °"
(1 ¡ °)(1¡ ") + °"
g[(1¡ ")H + "L] +
f®
H °"
(1¡ °)(1 ¡ ") +°"
+®
L (1¡ °)(1 ¡ ")
(1 ¡ °)(1¡ ") + °"





[(1¡ ")H + "L] +
1
2
[°H + (1 ¡°)L]: (8)
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 3 In the case where Innovators receive uninformative signals, the
portfolio of innovatorsis equal to the imitators’and so are their corresponding
expected returns, which equal:
E('In) = E('Im) =
1
2
[(1¡ ")H + "L]+
1
2
[°H + (1¡ °)L]: (9)
Proof. See appendix.
Our goal now is to show that, when learning occurs, the innovator will
have a better portfolio of deals than the imitator. The reason for this is
straight forward: the innovator’s bundle has more units of cash ‡ows of
institutions of the high types and these are ex-ante more likely to have high
33returns in t = 2:
Proposition 4 Whenever Innovators get an informative signal, E('In) >
E('Im):
Proof. See appendix.
Note that even though in some nodes of the last stage innovators will be
no di¤erent than imitators, the probability of reaching these nodes is small.
The event that there is no learning from the innovator becomes less likely
as the number of types increases: the number of uninformative signals is
always only two, while the total number of possible signals is 2F: This is
seen formally in equation (5), as
@»
@F > 0: This is intuitive: the more deals
across di¤erent types an innovator makes, the more likely it is he will learn
to improve his portfolio and the higher the pro…t margin he will have with
respect to imitators, as we will see below.
4.6 Issuers’s Choice
All issuers that sign this underwriting contract are willing to swap all their
units of X for the new payment stream Y: Since all investment bankers
o¤er the same per unit cash ‡ow Y; the institutions will be attracted to
34the banker that charges the lowest underwriting fee, s: That is, they choose
i 2 f1;2;:::;Ig to maximize Y ¡ si:
5 The Equilibrium
5.1 Bertrand Competition
We assume that investment banks will compete à la Bertrand in fees by
undercutting each other. The undercutting process will reach a halt when
imitators make zero pro…ts. As a result, the equilibrium fee will be given by
the imitators’ zero pro…t condition:
s
¤ = Y ¡ E('
Im): (10)
This will be the equilibrium underwriting fee charged to issuers. Indeed, for
that fee, the innovator makes the pro…t :
E('In) ¡ Y + s¤ = E('In) ¡ E('Im): (11)
If the pro…ts in (11) are positive, the pioneer will be able to marginally lower
his fee further to attract more institutions, as we will show later.
35Proposition 5 At t = 2; imitators make zero pro…t in equilibrium and the
innovator makes pro…t E('In)¡ E('Im):
Note that the higher the wedge between the expected returns of the port-
folio of innovator over the imitators’, the larger the developer’s pro…ts. The
innovator’s pro…ts are determined by the extent of the learning-by-doing in
the …rst stage, that is, by how much he learnt how to improve the money-
making scheme in the second round of underwriting with respect to the …rst.
Of course, in the unlikely event that there is no learning (no improving of
the portfolio of deals), competition by imitators will drive innovator’s second
stage pro…ts to zero.
5.2 Market Shares
If there is learning the developer’s pro…t will be positive and it will allow
him to undercut the fee s¤ further by, say, an epsilon, and swap as many
units of Y for X until his capacity constraint is reached. This will leave
imitators to share the rest of the underwriting market. If we assume that
issuers represent the short side of this market, the underwriting contracts
will be rationed across imitators. Even though all investment banks have the
same capacity, the equilibrium market shares of innovator and imitators are
36not the same. Since the innovator has the information advantage, he chooses
a lower fee that allows him to underwrite deals at full capacity.
As in standard Bertrand competition, in this model each imitator’s share
of the new product’s market is really undetermined because they make zero
pro…ts. Since the imitators are identical we can assume that the contracts
that remain to be underwritten after the innovator has taken his share are
equally rationed among them, following the general convention for Bertrand
allocations. This will leave the innovator being the market leader, i.e., having
the biggest market share.
Notice that it is not important that the innovator has a larger market
share. Just because he is better informed about the state of the world, he
is the only bank that can work at full capacity for any size of the market of
potential issuers, and he is the only banker making pro…ts with free-entry.
Here we illustrate that this model can have as a prediction the market-shares
leadership fact by assuming that imitators ration the proportion not under-
written by the innovator.
375.3 Optimality of Innovating
The …nal step is to …nd the optimal choice of the potential innovator and
the equilibrium allocations resulting from this choice. At t = 0 this bank
must decide whether or not to pay the development cost C. The potential
developer will have to take into account that the innovation is risky: if he
develops and pays C, there is a probability µ that the new product attracts
institutions, but with probability 1¡µ the innovation will not be marketable,
and the developer will make a loss.
If the innovative product proves to be successful, the developer will have
to face competition from imitators. Imitators will enter the market after they
see the …rst innovative deals. The developer’s pro…ts from these …rst deals,
i.e., in the learning stage, are zero. This is because in this stage the newly
established innovator has the same information and expertise as an imitator
in the next stage. So, since the time lapse between the introduction of a new
…nancial product and the appearance of imitations is typically very short, an
innovator in the …rst stage e¤ectively competes in fees with the imitators.
With no time discounting, if an innovator charges a higher underwriting
fee institutions will prefer to wait for the next period and make a more
38convenient deal with an imitator.16 As a consequence, for the investment in
the development of a new product to be worthwhile, the developer will have
to make positive pro…ts in the last stage, when competition from imitators
drives pro…t margins down.17 The developer will have on his side additional
expertise and informationover is competitors. In our model, this will happen
if and only if some learning occurs in the …rst stage, that is, with probability
»: With probability 1¡»; the innovator will have no comparative advantage
with respect to his imitators and will make zero pro…t.
To summarize, at t = 0; the expected pro…ts for a bank that decides to
invest to develop the innovation are:
µ[»(E('
In) ¡ E('
Im)) +(1 ¡ »)(0)] + (1¡ µ)(0)¡ C:
That is, at the start of the game, a potential developer will pay the develop-
16Indeed, when o¤ered an innovative deal by its developer at a given price, institutions
often search around to see if other bankers can o¤er them a cheaper deal. As we men-
tioned, this is one channel through which some strictly con…dential information about the
innovation is transmited to potential imitators. In reality, as we mentioned, what is rather
disclosed is the new swap technology, Y:
17This result is consistent with the evidence that Tufano [26] found: when they are
the sole underwriters, innovators do nto charge fees larger than when they compete with
imitators.
39ment cost C if and only if:
µ»[E('
In)¡ E('
Im)] ¸ C: (12)
Note that » increases in F: That is, the more deals a pioneer is able to make
prior to imitation, the higher the likelihood that he will gain expertise over
his competitors from his …rst issues and that he will perfect the way to make
money using this newway …nancial product. This constitutes his …rst-mover
advantage.
Despite the absence of patents and the possibility of cost-less and early
imitation, investment in R&D is still pro…table for the investment banks.
The monopolistic advantage derived from the …rst stage learning guaran-
tees positive pro…ts for innovators in the second period. Imitation may look
attractive because it is cost-less but, for this same reason, has the disadvan-
tage of being undertaken by almost all other banks: competition is …erce and
generates low (zero in our model) pro…ts.
406 Summary
Using a simpli…ed 2-by-2 version of our model we have concluded that in-
vestment banks have the incentive to pursue in the discovery and marketing
of a new …nancial product even in the absence of a patent that guaran-
tees a pro…table period of monopoly for the issuer. Innovation takes place
through an investment bank’s underwriting business: it makes an innovative
exchange of outstanding payment streams owned by …nancial institutions for
newly designed payment schedule. The incentive to innovate despite cost-
less imitation is given by the supra-normal pro…ts earned when exploiting
the information asymmetry generated by the learning from the …rst private
deals.
Our …nancial product is an innovation in the sense that the developer has
to pay a development cost to try to discover a new payo¤ function which will
attract institutions by providing improved hedging to their own cash ‡ows.
Like many other innovations, once one agent pays this development cost and
the innovation proves successful, there is no need for competitors to pay it
in order to market the imitation.
As innovators update their beliefs on the likelihood of di¤erent types hav-
ing higher earning streams they can pick the right institutions to sign the
41deals with in order to match them more e¤ectively ina portfolio. It is impor-
tant to stress that what makes innovation pro…table in this model is that the
innovator exploits an information advantage in the competitive stage. Also,
it is worth pointing out that the short lead time of the innovator merely
provides him an informational advantage and not a temporary monopoly
pro…t that could justify on its own the development stage expenditures. The
supra-normal pro…ts here are realized only during the imitation stage.
In this paper we have also explained why an innovator might end up
having the largest market share of the market for underwriting.
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46Appendix
Proof to Lemma 1. We ommit a proof, since we believe it is veri…ed
only by inspection.
Proof to Lemmas 2 & 3. In any state, one of the two …rms in the
bundle will have high cash ‡ows with a probability 1¡ " and the other with
probability °: When innovators receive an informative signal and form up the
bundle with larger weight for the good type, the true state could be indeed
the one suggested by the high signal, in which case the expected payo¤s of
the bundle would be
®
H[(1 ¡ ")H +"L] + ®
L[°H + (1¡ °)L]: (13)
In case thetrue state is not the most likely one, giventhe signal, the expected
payo¤ of the same bundle would be
®
L[(1¡ ")H + "L] +®
H[°H + (1¡ °)L]: (14)
Now then, the probability of receiving a “correct ” informative signal, i.e.,
the one where the good type has a payo¤ of H, is
(1¡")(1¡°)
(1¡")(1¡°)+"° while the
47probability of getting incorrect signals is
"°
(1¡")(1¡°)+"° :
The expected payo¤ to the innovators’ bundle at any node of the game
where the signal was informative is then nothing but the weighted average




(1 ¡ ")(1¡ °) + "°
f®
H[(1¡ ")H + "L]+ ®
L[°H + (1 ¡ °)L] +
"°
(1 ¡ ")(1¡ °) + "°
f®L[(1¡ ")H +"L] + ®H[°H + (1 ¡ °)L]g
= f®
H (1¡ ")(1¡ °)
(1¡ ")(1¡ °) +"°
+®
L "°
(1 ¡ ")(1¡ °) + "°
g[(1¡ ")H + "L] +
f®L (1 ¡ ")(1¡ °)
(1¡ ")(1 ¡ °)+ "°
+ ®H "°
(1 ¡ ")(1¡ °) + "°
g[°H +(1 ¡ °)L]:
For any uninformative signal, innovators choose equal weights for each





[(1¡ ")H + "L]+
1
2
[°H + (1¡ °)L]: (15)
Imitators behave just like innovators who have received signals that allow
no updating. They assign equal weights to each type in the bundle, thus the





= E['jz = 1]Pr[z = 1] + E['jz = 2]Pr[z = 2] (16)
E['jz = 1] = E['jz = 2] =
1
2
[(1 ¡ ")H +"L] +
1
2









[(1¡ ")H + "L] +
1
2
[°H + (1 ¡°)L]:
It is important to notice that this last result does not depend on the prob-
ability distribution. Imitators believe that Pr[z = 1] =Pr[z = 2] = 1
2; the
common prior. Once Innovators have updated their beliefs they will in gen-
eral …nd new di¤erent values for this probabilities. Therefore, it could be
argued that imitators are “wrong”, i.e., less accurate than the one made by
innovators that have learned more about the state of the world. However,




not depend on the probability distribution. Probabilities add up to one and
cancel out, since they multiply a common symmetric factor.
49By assumption, H > L, 0 < ";° <
1






H (1¡ ")(1 ¡ °)
(1¡ ")(1¡ °)+ "°
+®
L "°




g[(1 ¡ ")H +"L] +
f®
L "°
(1 ¡ ")(1 ¡°) + "°
+ ®
H (1¡ ")(1¡ °)




g[°H + (1¡ °)L]:
Substituting for ®L = 1 ¡ ®H;
E('In ¡ 'Im) = (®H ¡
1
2









)(1¡ ° ¡ ")(H ¡ L);
which is clearly positive by the assumptions above.
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